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Unde Venis et Quo Vadis? 
European tort law revisited
par Stathis Banakas1
I. Introductionnnn
The task of producing a common theory and common principles of European 
tort law has gone apace, with substantial theoretical and empirical work under­
taken in Germany, Austria and elsewhere,2 with two completed sets of European 
tort principles already published,3 and is an unavoidable result of the march to­
wards a common private law of Europe. In this paper, I wish to offer some 
1 Reader in Law, University of East Anglia, Norwich, England; Fernand Braudel Senior Fellow, Euro­
pean University Institute, Florence (Autumn 2008).
2 See for a sample of the burgeoning literature: Yearbook on European Tort Law (2001–), Publications 
of the European Centre for Tort and Insurance Law (ECTIL), edited by Koziol and others; W. van 
Boom, H. Koziol/Ch. A. Witting (eds), Pure Economic Loss, 2004; B.A. Koch (ed.), Terrorism, 
Tort Law and Insurance, 2004; H. Koziol/W. Doralt (eds), Abschlussprüfer. Haftung und Ver­
sicherung, 2004; H. Koziol/A. Warzilek (eds), Persönlichkeitsschutz gegenüber Massenmedien/
The Protection of Personality Rights against Invasions by Mass Media, 2005; M. Faure/T. Hartlief 
(eds), Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes: A Comparative Legal Approach, 2006; 
G. Wagner (ed.), Tort Law and Liability Insurance, 2005; Miquel Martín­Casals (ed.), Children 
in Tort Law, Part I: Children as Tortfeasors, 2006; Miquel Martín­Casals (ed.), Children in Tort 
Law, Part II: Children as Victims, 2006; W.H. van Boom/M. Lukas/C. Kissling (eds), Tort and 
Regulatory Law, 2007; S. Klosse/T. Hartlief (eds), Shifts in Compensating Work­Related Injuries 
and Diseases, 2007; M. Faure/A. Verheij (eds), Shifts in Compensation for Environmental Dam­
age, 2007; W.H. Van Boom/M. Faure (eds), Shifts in Compensation between Private and Public 
Systems, 2007; see also von Bar, The Common European Law of Torts, OUP 1998; Gert Brueg­
germeier, Common Principles of Tort Law, London 2004; Cees van Dam, European Tort Law, Ox­
ford 2006; Nils Jansen, ‘Principles of European Tort Law?, Grundwertungen und Systembildung im 
europäischen Haftungsrecht’, Rabels Zeitschrift fuer auslaendisches und internationales Privatrecht, 
70, 32–770 (2006); Stathis Banakas, ‘European Tort Law: Is it Possible?’ 9 European Review of 
Private Law, 363–375 (2002); Fairgrieve, Andenas, Bell (eds Tort Liability of Public Authorities 
in Comparative perspective, London 2002; Christian von Bar, Ulrich Drobnig (eds), The Interac­
tion of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law in Europe: A Comparative Study, Sellier Publishers 
2004; Mauro Bussani (ed.), European Tort Law, Eastern and Western Perspectives, Sellier Publis­
hers 2006.
3 See European Group on Tort Law, Principles of European Tort Law, with Commentaries, Springer 
verlag 2004, available online at http://www.egtl.org/(last visited 4.2.2008); see also the final version 
of the text on Principles of Civil Liability for Damages produced by the The Study Group on a Euro­
pean Civil Code, available online at http://www.sgecc.net/media/downloads/updatetortlawarticles_
copy.doc (last visited 4.3.2008).
Article
Banakas 296 SZIER/RSDIE 4/2008
thoughts on a new European tort law from the other side of the English channel, 
from a jurisdiction that stands alone (together with Ireland) in not sharing the 
roots and culture of Roman law in Europe,4 and from a country that is regularly 
seen as politically unfriendly to greater European integration. I am, however, 
encouraged by the voice of an English scholar, who is generally considered to 
be one of the most authoritative and brilliant masters of the common law, a de­
fender of its purity and originality, but who simultaneously, is also known for 
his devotion to translating modern German masterpieces of European legal sci­
ence into English. He once wrote:
‘law is ... [the] cement ... and faith in law ... [the] spiritual foundation’ of the European 
Union.5 
The European role of tort law in the private enforcement of European Commu­
nity legal standards and principles has recently been placed centre stage by ma­
jor judgments of the European Court of Justice, such as Munoz6 and Manfredi.7 
Nevertheless, fragmented and incoherent law that changes every time a citizen 
of the United Europe crosses the narrow frontiers of the country of his birth 
cannot cement anything. I can clearly hear the other voices noting the diversity 
of legal culture, concepts and techniques in European legal systems, and who 
are alarmed by the spectre of uniformity at the expense of tradition, language 
and dogmatic elegance. To be sure, these are important worries,8 but does any­
one wish to seriously argue that such considerations should stand in the way of 
improving the lot of European citizens? The point can be made with reference 
to several European harmonisation measures that have already been accom­
plished in the  field of the law of civil liability, and which are important in real 
rather than simply academic terms. One example is enough: the Product Liabil­
4 But see a different view in David Ibbetson, ‘Harmonisation of the Law of Tort and Delict: A Com­
parative and Historical Perspective’, in R. Zimmermann (ed.), Grundstrukturen des Europäischen 
Deliktrechts, 2003, 133 f.
5 Tony Weir, Foreword to Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition, OUP 1996; see also Helmut Koziol, Comparative Law – A Must in the Euro­
pean Union: Demonstrated by Tort Law as an Example, Journal of Tort Law Volume 1/Issue 3 (Oc­
tober 2007), available online at http://www.bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss3/(last visited 19.3.2008).
6 Case C­253/00, Muñoz and Fruiticola [2002] ECR I­7289 (of 17 September 2002), [2002] 3 
C.M.L.R. 26; see Gerrit Betlem, ‘Torts, A European Ius Commune and the Private Enforcement of 
Community Law,’ [2005] Cambridge Law Journal 126.
7 Joined cases 295/04 to 298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA (295/04) 
etc., 13 July 2006 (ECJ) 37–52; see note by Giorgio Afferni in European review of contract law 
2007, 179–190; Francisco Marcos/Albert Sánchez Graells, ‘Towards a European Tort Law? 
Damages  actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules: harmonising Tort Law through the back door?’, 
SSRN Working Papers, available online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1028963#PaperDownload (last visited 4.2.2008).
8 See Pierre Legrand, ‘Sens et non­sens d’un code civil européen’, (1996) Revue Internationale de 
Droit Compare, 779, and ‘Against a European Civil Code’, 60 Modern L. Rev 44 (1997).
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ity Directive of 1985, which despite its lack of elegance and theoretical purity 
and its disregard for subtle conceptual divergences in national legal systems and 
for traditional principles and techniques, has proved highly successful in pro­
moting the uniform civil law enforcement of standards in product safety across 
the European Union.
In the ongoing process of harmonisation of European private law, Swiss law 
is far from an outside observer, looking in with interest. European legal devel­
opments are, as is well known, followed closely in Switzerland, where more 
often than not, major European private law is swiftly incorporated into Swiss 
law, as the example of the Product Liability Directive of 1985 demonstrates.9 
Additionally, Swiss legal doctrine and several leading Swiss scholars,10 often 
contribute new and original ideas directly to the debate on European private 
law. Later on in this paper, I will seek to illustrate this contribution with particu­
lar reference to one important and forward­looking Swiss civil liability prin­
ciple, which bridges the gap between contract and tort law, namely the principle 
of extra­contractual liability for reasonable reliance (Vertrauenshaftung).11
II. nnn
Let me now offer a comparative overview of the three leading European tort 
traditions: English, French and German law; their richness and diversity hides 
the fact that all three aim at the same results but use cumbersome and often un­
necessarily complicated conceptual apparatuses. 
9 The Swiss Product Liability Act, enacted on January 1, 1994, largely adheres to the principles of EC 
Directive 85/374, and provides for strict liability of a manufacturer, importer or supplier for death, 
injuries, damages or destruction of an object for private use caused by a defective product. Article 8 
provides that the liability of a producer to an injured person may not be limited or excluded by con­
tract.
10 Professor Franz Werro of the University of Fribourg is currently the Chair of the Tort group in the 
Common Core of European Private Law project, and joint editor and editor of two volumes in the 
series already published: see Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds), The Common Core of Euro­
pean Private Law, 2002.
11 See, generally, Chappuis, Christine/Winiger, Bénédict (Hrsg.), La responsabilité fondée sur la 
confiance, Vertrauenshaftung, Zürich 2001; Kramer, Ernst A./Probst, Th., Bundesgerichtspraxis 
zum Allgemeinen Teil des Schweizerischen Obligationenrechts, Zürich 2003. See also my article 
‘Liability for Incorrect Financial Information: Theory and Practice in a General Clause System and 
in a Protected Interests System’, in 7 European Review of Private Law 261–286, (1999), for a Com­
parative study of English, French and German law.
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A. nnn
English law can be described as an ‘open’ case­law system, in which, as Car­
dozo J. put it, the truths given by induction tend to form the premises for new 
deductions.12 The development of the English law of tort was characterised by a 
separate evolution of individual torts until the advent of Donoghue v Steven-
son13 and the generic tort of negligence. Negligence, together with another ‘ge­
neric’ tort, Nuisance, now provides the main actions for non­premeditated harm. 
Before the landmark case of Hedley Byrne,14 there was also a strong judicial 
conviction, sometimes referred to as the product of a certain ‘principle’ of com­
mon law, documented in a wealth of precedent, that there could be no liability 
for non­premeditated harm of a purely financial nature, except in special cir­
cumstances, including those where an action for public nuisance might lie. It 
must be noted here that, as some recent developments have also indicat(ed.), the 
common law attitude to non­premeditated financial harm, both before and after 
Hedley Byrne, is better explained as the product of a design of tortious liability 
based on the significance of the kind of injury caus(ed.), rather than the quality 
of the interest involved. In this respect, Anglo­American law is stylistically 
quite different from both French and German law. This difference is a primary 
reason that certain outwardly similar concepts, rules or even general principles 
of liability perform dissimilar functions in each of the three systems.15
B. nnn
The French and German tort systems are founded upon codified rules and prin­
ciples. They are both, however, much less ‘closed’ than might be expected. In 
France, in particular, the application of the laconic provisions of the general 
clauses of arts. 1382 et seq. of the Code Civil can only be understood in the 
light of the principles and rules contained in the massive volume of jurispru­
dence that these provisions have generated. The courts have creat(ed.), in apply­
ing those provisions, a body of case law that has made the French law of tor­
12 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1921, p. 124, see also Coing, Grundzüge der 
 Rechtsphilosophie 2nd ed., p. 347 f.; see also the remark by Atiyah: ‘...the [common law] system 
works as a whole even if we cannot say why it works and what rational purpose the different bits may 
serve’: P.S. Atiyah, Pragmatism and theory in english law, London 1987, p. 34.
13 [1932] A.C. 562.
14 See the account of English law before Hedley Byrne in Atiyah (1967) 83 Law Quarterly Review 
249 f.
15 On ‘functionality’ as the basic methodological principle of Comparative Law see Zweigert/Kotz 
(Weir) An Introduction to Comparative Law, I, 2nd ed., 1987, p. 28 f., with important further refer­
ences.
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tious liability more open, flexible and liberal than many a contemporary tort 
system.
In German tort law the rights and interests protected by the law are directly 
(e.g. in paras. 823I or 824), or indirectly, (e.g. in paras. 823 II and 839) enumer­
ated in the BGB. To this enumeration the clausula doli of para. 826 BGB must 
be add(ed.), which provides a remedy for wilful damage (and the merely pecu­
niary) caused contra bonos mores (‘gegen die guten Sitten’). In para. 823I BGB, 
which contains the main action for non­premeditated harm, pure financial in­
terests (‘Vermögen’) are not included in the enumeration of the ‘protected 
rights’. These are specified as the rights to one’s life, body, health, freedom or 
property, or ‘other’ similar rights, i.e. according to the prevailing view in the 
literature, of a similarly ‘absolute’ nature (e.g. various property rights or family 
rights). However, the rigidity of this ‘enumerative’ system has occasionally been 
put to the test by the courts, and especially so in the late 50s and early 60s, when 
in a daring formulation of two additional protected rights, the ‘right to an 
 established and operating business’ and the ‘general right of personality’ were 
found.16
C. The Legal Concept of Damage
A prerequisite of civil liability, which in every jurisdiction the plaintiff must be 
able to establish in order for his claim to commence, is that the defendant’s con­
duct resulted in a type of injury recognised by the law as capable of giving rise 
to a legal claim, i.e. legally significant ‘damage’. The question of what is legally 
recognised damage is always a question of law, to be resolved by the court: jura 
novit curia. The plaintiff must prove in every case, as a matter of fact, that his 
injury falls under this category. It is important not to confuse this question with 
the issue of whether an injury that is legally significant ‘damage’ (damnum), 
has been also wrongfully inflicted (as with damnum iniuria datum of the Ro­
man Lex Aquilia), under the individual circumstances of each particular case. 
The latter issue is, conceptually, quite separate from the former, referring to the 
defendant’s conduct rather than the plaintiff ’s injury, and it raises both a point of 
law and a point of fact in all legal systems.
Not every injury is necessarily a ‘damage’ in the eyes of the law, although 
there are systems that profess to have adopted an ‘open’ legal concept of dam­
age, which is able to accommodate most kinds of harm. A legal system may 
choose to adopt a concept of damage that has either a ‘factual’ or a ‘normative’ 
complexion. A ‘factual’ complexion is evident where (a) all kinds of actual 
16 See the seminal article of V. Caemmerer ‘Wandlungen des Deliktsrechts’, Gesammelte Schriften, 
Vol 1, 1968, p. 452 f.
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harm can qualify as ‘damage’, and where (b) there can never be legally signifi­
cant ‘damage’ in the absence of actual harm of some sort. A ‘normative’ com­
plexion means that only selected types of actual harm qualify as ‘damage’ in the 
eyes of the law, and that it is also possible for the law to accept the presence of 
legally significant ‘damage’ even when no actual harm is outwardly evident. 
Especially in the area of non­premeditated harm, it appears that both Anglo­
American and French law employ, in principle, a predominantly factual concept 
of damage, with certain important exceptions. The position of German law is 
far less clear.
a. Under French law it appears that the presence of actual harm is a sine qua 
non condition of compensation: ‘sans dommage, pas de droit a reparation’.17 
This principle is not, however, easy to reconcile with certain cases where com­
pensation is given for losses that have, in truth, already been made good to the 
plaintiff in some other way.18 And the rise of the sovereign power of the trial 
courts in the assessment of damages, coupled with their well­known refusal to 
disclose details about the method that they use, has not allowed a study of the 
exact role of normative considerations in such assessments. That said, there are 
also certain defined areas of the French law of damages where a normative con­
cept of damage with a specifically determined scope and function is openly 
used. The so­called ‘prejudice collectif ’, i.e. injury to the legitimate collective 
interests of a professional or a trade union, is a most notable example in this 
regard.19
b. The English law of torts has, on the other hand, a tradition of so­called 
‘torts actionable per se’.20 Given that in the past the action for damages also 
used to serve the purpose of testing for the existence of a ‘right’; in such cases, 
the presence of actual harm was not always necessary for the plaintiff to be able 
to sue. In negligence, however, only actual harm is compensated.21 However, 
with their practice of ‘general damages’ awards, English courts have allowed 
themselves considerable space for normative manoeuvring. It is often the case 
17 See Weill/Terre/Lequette, Droit Civil, Les Obligations, 6th ed., 1996, nos 668 f.; for a more re­
cent work, see Philippe Brun, Responsabilite Civile Extarcontractuelle, LexisNexis/Litec, 2005.
18 See the discussion ibid.; and Civ. 2e, DS 1976 J. 137 note Le Tourneau, as well as Civ. 2e Juin 1976, 
RGAT 1977, 369.
19 See Weill/Terre, no 769; for ‘syndicats professionnels’ see art. L. 411?11 C. Tr.
20 In some cases an action in tort lies without any proof of damage; the reason is historical: see Clerk 
and Lindsell Torts, para. 302, supplying a catalogue of cases where actual damage is unnecessary. 
Trespass to land, person (but unintentional trespass to person may now need proof of damage: see 
Letang v. Cooper [1965]1 Q.B. 232, 245 per Diplock L.J.) or goods, and libel (see Hayward v. Hay-
ward (1887) 34 Ch. D. 198) are notable examples of torts actionable per se.
21 The tort of negligence is ‘traditionally described as damage, which is not too remote, caused by a 
breach of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff’: Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, para. 859, 
referring to Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. v. M’Mullan [1934] A.C. 1, 25 per Lord Wright.
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that such awards go far beyond the monetary value of the actual harm suffered. 
The usefulness of this practice becomes only too evident with novel types of 
injury: if the courts feel that they are fit for compensation, the mechanism is 
there to accommodate them. English courts have had the opportunity of accom­
modating several novel claims for losses whose nature is far from clear, e.g. a 
claim for the loss of the enjoyment of a holiday. The practice of awarding gen­
eral damages has spared English courts the dogmatic controversy that similar 
claims have caused elsewhere.
c. In Germany, it is often argued that the BGB, apparently under the strong 
influence of Mommsen,22 endorsed a strictly factual, ‘materialistic’ concept of 
damage. His is considered to be the philosophy behind the principle of non­
compensation of so­called ‘non­material’ losses (para. 253 BGB). But the com­
parative work of Neuner in the 1930s, and several other German scholars more 
recently, has created a theoretical movement in favour of revising the orthodoxy 
of this view. Neuner’s ‘normative’ theory of damage was directly inspired by 
the old common law tradition of using the tortious action as a testing ground for 
the existence of a right; Neuner called this the ‘rechtsverfolgende Funktion’ of 
the action for damages. Neuner became, in this way, the apostle of a new faith 
that has proved hard to fight for Mommsen’s intellectual disciples in the dec­
ades following his seminal article in the ‘Archiv für die civilistische Praxis’.23 
Neuner’s work, and its effect on the evolution of German doctrine and juris­
prudence, provide a rare and striking example of the transplantation not merely 
of a principle or a doctrine, but of a whole tradition, from a legal system with a 
highly individual experimental style, into a legal system of the highest dogmatic 
sophistication. The transplantation becomes even more noteworthy if one con­
siders that the tradition in question was, at the time of its initiation in Germany, 
rapidly declining in England, and today is only of peripheral importance.
From the ‘rechtsverfolgende Funktion’ of the tortious action Neuner con­
cluded that the concept of ‘damage’ itself has to be a normative concept. The 
law should be left free to work out its own concept of damage for its own pur­
poses. Assessment of damages should, furthermore, be made on the objective 
basis of the ‘common value’ of the perished interest (‘gemeine Wert’), rather 
than on the basis of its subjective value. The latter was another postulate of the 
traditional Mommsenian concept of damage. Neuner’s ideas were further de­
22 Mommsen, ‘Zur Lehre von dem Interesse’, 1855.
23 Neuner, ‘Interesse und Vermogensschaden’, AcP 133, 277 f. (1931); see also, a year later, Wilburg, 
‘Zur Lehre von der Vorteilsausgleichung’, in JherJb 82, 51 f. For a critical account of the literature 
following these two articles see Grunsky, Aktuelle probleme zum Begriff des Vermogensschadens, 
1968; Hagen, ‘Fort – oder Fehlenentwicklung des Schadensbegriffs’, JuS 1969, 61 f.; Hauss, in 
ZVersWiss 1967, 15 1; Zeuner, ‘Schadensbegriff und Ersatz von Vermogensschaden’, AcP 163, 380 
(1963); idem, in Gedachtnisschrift fur Dietz 1972, 99 f.; Baur, in FS Raiser, 1974, at p. 120 f.
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veloped by several other authors; among others, by Bydlinski (he calls the 
award of damages ‘a sanction for the injured interest or good’),24 and Larenz 
(who introduced the idea of a ‘Rechtsfortsetzungsfunction’ of the action for 
damages).25 Nevertheless, the theoretical debate has not made things easier for 
the courts; a series of important decisions now favour a normative concept of 
damage, which they fail, however, to define in any clear terms, but rather use as 
a policy platform. And dogmatists have come up with an even more confusing 
series of theories.26 Case­law and doctrine are now so divided., that it is not pos­
sible to identify with certainty the criteria of ‘damage’ under German law, and 
to determine what function is served by damages awards. 
The latest theoretical constructions have aggravated rather than removed 
this uncertainty.27 One of these, the so­called ‘commercialisation’ doctrine,28 is 
trying to dress novel types of harm (which can hardly qualify as straightforward 
cases of material loss) under the guise of a ‘commercial’ hypostasis, allowing 
their compensation, by circumventing in this way the barrier of para. 253 
BGB. 
D. The Causal Link
Proof of sufficient causal link is required by every modern tort system as a nec­
essary condition of liability; a postulate of the principle of personal responsibil­
ity. The causal connection is preferable to any other, such as, for instance, a 
spatio­temporal one.29
24 Probleme der Schadensverursachung nach deutschem und osterreichischem Recht, 1964, p. 29 f.
25 Schuldrecht, Vol. 1, 11th ed., p. 346. A good account of the German debate on the concept of damage 
can be found in Hermann Lange, Schadensersatz 1979, p. nn See also E. Wolf, in FS Schieder­
maier 1976, 545 f. Kondgen, in AcP 177, 1f. (1977), attempts an economic analysis of the issue. 
Finally, a detailed comparative study is Magnus, Schaden und Ersatz, 1987.
26 E.g. Wilburg, IherJb 82, 51 f.; f.r. in Mertens, Der Begriff des Vermögensschadens im Bürgerli­
chen Recht, 1967, pp. 50 f., 87 f. Keuk, Vermogensschaden und Interesse, 1972, Hagen, JuS 1969, 
61, and Kondgen, AcP 177, I f. are all critical of Neuner’s original approach.
27 See, e.g., Hansen, Normativer Schadensbegriff und Schadensberechnung, 1977. And the comments 
of Baur, in FS Raiser 1974, 119 f., to which those of Lieb, JZ 1971, 3S8, Hagen, in FS Larenz 1973, 
867 f. Stoll, Begriff und Grenzen des Vermogensschadens 1973,1 f., 36 f., and idem, in JZ 1975, 
252 and JZ 1977, 97, must be added.
28 References to Jurisprudence and Doctrine can be found in Kuppers, Verdorbene Genüsse und verei­
telte Aufwendungen im Schadensersatzrecht, 1976; Tolk, Der Frustrierungsgedanke und die Kom­
merzialisierung immaterieller Schaden, 1977. See also Heldrich, NJW 1967,1737; Grunsky, NJW 
1975, 609 f.; Mamey, NJW 1969, 1150; Bartl, NJW 1972; 505 f; Stoll and Schmidt, under BGH 
(BGHZ 63, 98) JZ 1975, 249, and LM Nr 37 zu para. 249 (A) BGB respectively; Stoll, in JZ 1977, 
96 under OLG Frankurt 6.4.1976; Honsell, JuS 1976, 222; and Hermann Lange Schadensersatz, 
1979, p. 167 f., 229 f., 235 f., w.f.r.
29 See the discussion in Honore, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law XI, ch. 7, p.7 f.; for 
a more recent European Comparative study see Benedict Winiger, Helmut Koziol, Bernhard A. 
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A great deal of ink has been spilt on the question of the proper criterion of 
legal causation. Apart from the self­evident fact (on which all tort systems us­
ing the causal explanation cannot but agree) that the defendant’s conduct must 
be at least a condition ‘sine qua non’ of the harm complained of, there appears 
to exist a healthy diversity in modern tort laws as to the criteria of ‘legal’ causa­
tion that the courts apply next. 
a. In French law, it is commonly accepted in the context of art. 1382 f. of the 
C.C. that a ‘direct’ causal link must exist between the defendant’s conduct and 
the damage suffered. The exact meaning of this (unwritten though apparently 
indisputable) rule,30 is not very clear. It cannot mean that the defendant’s con­
duct must be the sole condition of the harm, because this would be defining li­
ability too narrowly. It has been suggested that whenever there is an independ­
ent or subsequent condition of the harm, other than the defendant’s conduct, 
with a special ‘explanatory’ force (e.g. where it may be considered ‘abnormal’ 
under the circumstances), then the defendant’s conduct ceases to be a ‘direct’ 
cause of the harm.31 Another view is that only ‘necessary’ consequences are 
‘direct’ consequences, but this hardly explains anything.32 It is, on the other 
hand, noteworthy that ‘foreseeability’, so important a criterion in common law 
and, also, of central importance in German law, too, has been described as ‘une 
idee directrice’ for the judge in this connection.33 Some recent French decisions 
have actually turned to a test of legal causation similar to the German ‘ade­
quacy’ test.34 Of special interest is, also, another interpretation of ‘directness’, 
which relates the causation rule to the legal notion of fault: the more serious the 
defendant’s fault, the more ‘direct’ its consequences. If the fault is extremely 
serious, e.g. malice, the defendant must account for virtually all harmful conse­
quences. Marteau, who advanced this view,35 was probably influenced by the 
treatment of serious fault in other legal systems. In common law, for example, 
there is a well­established principle, according to which ‘intended conse­
Koch, Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Essential Cases on Natural Causation: 1 (Digest of European 
Tort Law), Springer Verlag, 2007.
30 See Weill/Terre, Obligations, 2nd ed., p. 810 F.; Mazeaud/Mazeaud, Traite, Vol. 11, 6th ed., No. 
1666 f.; Le Tourneau Responsabilite Civile, 2nd ed., p. 197 f.; Carbonnier Droit Civil, IV, 7th ed., 
p. 319 f. And also the comparative discussion in Honore IntEncCompL XI, ch. 7, p. 40 f.
31 Honore, op. cit., p. 41.
32 See, e.g., the discussion in Mazeaud/Mazeaud, Traite, Il, 6th ed., No. 1673.
33 Mazeaud/Mazeaud, 6th ed. II, p. 791; foreseeability plays a central role also in contractual liability, 
and it has been suggested by R. Savatier (Responsabilite Civile, 2d (ed.) , II, No. 472) that all fore­
seeable harm could qualify as ‘direct’, regardless of cause of action.
34 See. e.g., Mazeaud/Mazeaud, 6th ed., II, No. 1442–2; Weill/Terre, Obligations, 2nd ed., p. 811; 
compare Le Tourneau Responsabilite, 2nd ed., Nos 528 f.
35 Marteau, La causalite dans la responsabilite civile, 1914, p. 221 f.
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quences’ are ‘never too remote’,36 and in Germany wrongful intention receives 
similarly harsh treatment.37 Marteau considered the defendant’s fault to be the 
most important factor to influence the judge’s mind as to the imputability of 
certain consequences; he believed that ‘la formule du dommage indirect est une 
fausse etiquette qui sert a designer le jus moderandi du juge francais’.38 How­
ever, three objections were advanced against this:39 firstly, it has been noted that 
a similar distinction between intentional and non­intentional consequences is 
not made in the field of contractual liability (art. 1151 C.C.), where, besides 
‘directness’ itself as a criterion of causation, originates. Secondly, it has been 
observed that the very idea of a moderating power of the judge in awarding 
damages is contrary to the wishes of the authors of the Code Civil, as revealed 
in the record of its ‘motives’. Thirdly, since the application of the principle of 
directness affects the legal issue of causation, it is subjected to the control of the 
Cour de Cassation; a ‘jus moderandi’, belonging to the sovereign power of the 
trial judge, would make this control virtually impossible. 
It is submitted., however, that Marteau’s observations are not entirely de­
void of truth. In an oblique way the French judge has in fact been given a cer­
tain ‘jus moderandi’ i.e. by being granted., in practice, an effective discretion in 
the actual assessment of damages. And the courts cannot but be influenced by 
the degree of fault involved when deciding the issue of ‘directness’. Carbon­
nier would go so far as to say that ‘on donne une idee assez juste de la jurispru­
dence, en disant qu’elle s’attache a une causalite morale plutot que materiel­
36 ‘The intention to injure the plaintiff disposes of any question of remoteness’: Quinn v. Leathem 
[l901] A.C. 495, 537 per Lord Lindley. The same applies to reckless indifference regarding a harmful 
event: for the purposes of liability, recklessness is treated as bad intention: see Clerk & Lindsell, 
Torts, 14th ed., para. 339. Deceitful statements engage the tortfeasor’s liability for all damage flow­
ing directly from the fraud, whether foreseeable or not: Doyle v. Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd. [1969] 2 
Q.B. 158 (C.A.); this is the case despite the fact that the damage is only pecuniary (contrary to what 
appears to be the general causation rule in negligence, regarding the extent of liability for pecuniary 
damage.
37 The tortfeasor must account for intended harm, even when it fails to qualify as an ‘objectively prob­
able’ (i.e. ‘adequate’) consequence of his conduct; ‘Wer einen Menschen mit einer Schusswaffe 
verletzen will und trifft, hat fur diese Fogle einzustehen, selbst wenn die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer 
Verletzung dem Standort des Schützen nach in der Nähe der Nullgrenze bewegt’: Hermann Lange, 
Schadensersatz, p. 70, stating and explaining the rule that liability also extends to ‘non­adequate’ 
harm, when the latter is intended.
38 Marteau, op. cit. supra, p. 221. See the strikingly similar pragmatic approach of a leading English 
judge, Lord Hoffmann, who noted that:
 ‘There is nothing special or mysterious about the law of causation. One decides, as a matter of law, 
what causal connection the law requires and one then decides, as a question of fact, whether the 
claimant has satisfied the requirements of the law. There is, in my opinion, nothing more to be said’. 
See Leonard Hoffmann, ‘Causation’, Law Quarterly Review 2005, 121, 592, 603.
39 Mazeaud/Mazeaud, 6th ed., II, No. 1672.
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le’.40 The influence of the degree of fault is, besides, no lesser in the context of 
an ‘adequacy’ theory of causation relating the ‘generally foreseeable’ harm (the 
most common criterion of ‘adequacy’) to the type of harm of which the defend­
ant’s conduct significantly increased the probability. This version of the ‘ade­
quacy’ theory has been criticised, too, for confusing fault and causation.41
b. In German law, the conditio sine qua non test is coupled with a test of 
‘adequate cause’, whose correctional intervention is meant to avert an intolera­
ble expansion of liability. The most common version of the ‘adequacy’ theory 
employs a test according to which a condition of the harm may be considered as 
a causa adequata when it has increased the objective probability of the harm. 
The significance of a condition is considered ex post facto (forecast with hind­
sight: in German ‘nachträgliche Prognose’). It is, moreover, the ‘hindsight’ of a 
most prudent and perceptive observer that is to be taken into account, and the 
calculation of harm­probability is done in the light of ‘all the knowledge of 
laws and generalisations’ available to mankind.42
This formula has run into difficulties in practice, especially in connection 
with certain types of consequential loss (e.g. ulterior harm).43
c. The common law test of ‘reasonable foreseeability’ has strong similarities 
with the German ‘adequacy’ test.44 For example it has been held that foreseea­
bility is determined in the light of the knowledge of the ‘reasonable’ man after 
the act.45 Proof of foreseeability is an absolutely necessary condition for a claim 
to be accepted in negligence, in Anglo­American law. If the harm is not shown 
to be foreseeable ‘in kind’, then there is no question of recovery, even if it can 
be shown to be ‘direct’.46 On the other hand, a physical loss that is shown to 
40 Carbonnier, Droit Civil, 7th (ed.) IV, p. 319.
41 See Dalcq, Traite de la responsabilite civile, Vol. II, No. 2374; but in most versions of the adequacy 
theory the ‘generally foreseeable’ or ‘objectively probable’ condition is so defined (see infra, under 
b in the text) as to defeat this criticism: see Honore, in IntEncCompL XI ch. 7, no. 86. ‘Adequacy’ 
gives way, on the other hand, to the simple conditio sine qua non test in the case of intended harm: 
supra. And in the case of non­premeditated harm it is often likely that a serious amount of careless­
ness will have a stronger explanatory force, no matter how objectively the ‘adequate’ cause is de­
fined; this is not, however, a confusion of fault and causation, but a reflection of the fact that a causa­
tion theory based on probability cannot but take into account the degree to which seriousness of fault 
and probability of harm are in proportion.
42 For the adequacy theory used in Germany see Deutsch, Haftungsrecht, I, 1976, p. 146 f.; Herman 
Lange, Schadensersatz, p. 57 f., both with comprehensive further references to literature and juris­
prudence. See also Honore, IntEncCompL XI, ch. 7, p. 49 f., for a general discussion of ‘probabil­
ity’ theories of causation, of which the adequacy theory is by far the most important.
43 Honore, op. cit., p. 54.
44 See Stathis Banakas, ‘Causalité juridique et imputation: réflexions sur quelques développements 
récents en droit anglais’, Revue Lamy Droit Civil, Suppl. au No 40, July/August 2007, 93.
45 See the analysis in Dias, [1967] C.L.J. 62, 68, 77–82.
46 Since The Wagon Mound (No 1) [l961] A.C. 388, the House of Lords has held that if the damage is 
foreseeable in kind neither the unforeseeable extent of the injury nor the unforeseeable manner of its 
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have been foreseeable may be recoverable, even if it is ‘indirect’.47 In German 
law, too, it seems that physical losses, if they can be taken to be among the ob­
jectively foreseeable consequences of the harmful event, are recoverable, even 
when they appear to be ‘indirect’.48
E. The Additional German Condition of 
‘Unlawfulness’49 and the Common Law Concept 
of the ‘Duty of Care’50
‘Damage’ in a legal sense and the causal connection between damage and fault 
(or any other recognised harmful event) are the absolutely necessary conditions 
of civil liability in any compensation system which is not based on risk­insur­
ance (public or private). It may be that these two also are the only formal condi­
tions of tortious liability, as in the case of articles 1382 et seq. of the French 
Code Civil. Sometimes, however, a legal system also requires that the defend­
ant’s behaviour, as against the plaintiff ’s harm, is ‘unlawful’. This may be merely 
meant to emphasize that there are no grounds of legal justification at issue, like, 
for instance, self defence. However, it may further mean, as it does in German 
law, that the law recognises in a particular event an objectively offensive nature, 
which is contrary to the residual postulates of the legal order, and which alone 
may create a legal obligation to provide satisfaction, in the form of compensa­
tion or otherwise. Unlawfulness in this sense (‘Rechtswidrigkeit’) is, in German 
law, a necessary condition of tortious liability. In a parallel way, the breach of an 
existing duty of care is a necessary condition of liability in the common law of 
negligence. 
incidence can absolve the defendant: see Smith v. Leech Brain & Co., Ltd., [1962] 2 Q.B. 405; 
Hughes v. Lord Advocate [1963] A.C. 837. These principles apply only to physical loss, i.e. injury to 
person or property. 
47 As has been illustrated by the House of Lords decision in the case of Dorset Yacht Ltd. v. Home Of-
fice [1970] A.C. 1004: see the remarks of Lord Denning M.R., in S.C.M. v. W.J. Whittall & Son, Ltd 
[1971] I Q.B. 337, 43. In Hedley Byrne, too, the loss complained of was ‘indirect’, according to 
Lord Denning M.R., in the S.C.M. case (at p. 343); it follows that the Hedley Byrne duty of care 
extends to all reasonably foreseeable damage, whether ‘direct’ or not. In this respect liability for 
economic loss from negligent misstatements is, perhaps, similar to liability for physical loss.
48 See BGHZ 41,123.
49 See v. Caemmerer, op. cit., supra, note 48, and Rabel, Das Recht des Warenkaufs 1936 for two pio­
neering comparative studies. Also Limpens, La theorie de la relativite aquilienne en droit compare, 
Melanges Savatier, 1965, 550; Deutsch, Haftungsrecht I, 1976, p. 234 f.; Honore, in IntEncCompL 
XI, ch. 7, esp. p. 60 f.
50 A classic account is Clerk & Lindsell, Torts, paras. 861 & 861a.
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a. The concept of ‘unlawfulness’, as a general condition of civil liability,51 is 
an original product of German law, a creation of the great spirits of Hegel52 and 
Jhering.53 It is shared by all systems belonging to the German legal family.54 
German scholars acknowledge that there is no satisfactory definition of ‘unlaw­
fulness’, except perhaps a ‘tautological’ one: ‘unlawful’ is that which is con­
trary to the legal order’.55 Professor Deutsch notes that this formula has the 
advantage of being ‘luckenhaft und unbestimmt’, allowing for necessary flexi­
bility.56 A certain course of conduct may, in the first instance, be directly de­
clared ‘unlawful’ by the law.57 Secondly, its unlawfulness while not expressly 
declared may arise from its express prohibition by the law. Thirdly, an act may 
be unlawful when it transgresses a so­called primary rule (‘norm’). Evidence of 
such a transgression is found where a particular conduct gives rise to a right of 
compensation.
Cases of the latter kind have created problems. It is obvious that conduct 
expressly prohibited by the law is, without more, ‘unlawful’: e.g. driving with­
out a licence. However where the law merely enumerates ‘protected interests’, 
without prescribing the type of unlawful conduct that gives rise to compensa­
tion, (para. 823 I BGB), there is a need to define which conduct is meant to be 
‘unlawful’. This task befalls on the scholars, those influential jurtsprudentes of 
German legal life.
Two main theories have emerged. 
First, the older ‘classical’ doctrine of the ‘unlawfulness of the result’ 
(‘ Erfolgsunrechtslehre’; followed even today by a section of the jurisprudence, 
51 For details see the major textbooks (Larenz, Esser/Schmidt, Fikentscher, Deutsch, Hermann 
Lange) and: v. Caemmerer, Die absoluten Rechte in para. 8231 BGB, GesSchriften 1,1968, p. 554 f.; 
Deutsch, Fahrlaessigkeit und erforderliche Sorgfalt, 1963; Nipperdey, in Karlsruher Forum 61, 3; 
idem, NJW 1957, 1977; Weitnauer, ‘Kausalitatsprobleme in rechtsvergleichender Sicht’, FS Wahl, 
1973,109 f; Sourlas, Adäquanztheorie und Normzwecklehre bei der Bergrüdung der Haftung nach 
para. 8231 BGB, 1974, esp. p. 26 f., 35 f, w.f.r. Hermann Lange, in JZ 1976, 198 f; idem, Schadens­
ersatz, p. 73 w.f.r. For Austria see Welser, in OJZ 1975,1 f. & 37 f. also Kramer, in JZ 1976 338 f. 
For Switzerland see Descheneaux, ‘Norme et causalite en responsabilite civile’, in FS Schw. BG 
1975, 399 w.f. comparative references; also Tandogan, De l’utilite en droit suisse des notions de 
rapport d’illiceite et d’adequation sociale, 1972.
52 Hegel (ed. Hoffmeister), Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 4th ed., 1955, paras. 82 f.
53 Jhering, Das Schuldmoment im römischen Privatrecht, 1867, p. 5.
54 See Stoll in RabelsZ 1959, 370; v. Caemmerer (op. cit., supra), GesSchriften 1, 1968, 452, esp. 
p. 542 f. where German and Swiss law are compared to French and Anglo­American. Also Deutsch 
Haftungsrecht I, 1976, p. 192 f. w.f.r.
55 Deutsch, ibid., p. 190; for Austria see Koziol, Osterreichisches Haftpflichtrecht, Vol I, p. 70.
56 Deutsch, ibid., p. 191.
57 E.g. para. 858I BGB (unlawful interference with possession). Deutsch calls this an ‘authentic inter­
pretation’ by the law of ‘unlawfulness’ in connection with a particular course of conduct: Haftungs­
recht I, p. 191.
Article
Banakas 308 SZIER/RSDIE 4/2008
especially within the lower courts)58 proposes that every invasion of a protected 
right is ex definitio ‘unlawful’, provided there are no grounds of legal justifica­
tion (‘Rechtfertigungsgründe’). The invasion ‘indicates’ its own unlawfulness. 
Nipperdey,59 Reichel,60 Wietholter,61 and other German scholars62 have 
strongly attacked this theory on the grounds that it produces unsatisfactorily 
harsh results with regard to non­intentional harm. They have argued that non­
intentional invasions of a protected right are not always unlawful; only when 
expressly so prescribed by the law (e.g. driving without a licence) or when they 
amount to a breach of a certain ‘general duty of care’ (‘allgemeines Sorgfaltsp­
flicht’). This approach has been further elaborated upon by von Caemmerer 
and has become known as the ‘doctrine of the unlawfulness of action’ (‘Hand­
lungsunrechtslehre’). It is the second and more modern of the two current doc­
trines, and it teaches, in brief, that while intentional invasions of protected rights 
are always unlawful, indirect non­intentional invasions are only unlawful if, ob­
jectively judged., they constitute a breach of the ‘general duty of care’. An ex­
ample of an ‘indirect’ non­intentional but unlawful invasion of such right is 
given by the famous BGH case concerning a chicken incubator machine.63 
There, a person responsible for a non­intentional power­cut was found liable for 
an unlawful invasion of the right of property of the owner of the machine, when 
incubating eggs, which were in the machine at the time of the black­out, were 
damaged. The ‘unlawfulness’ of the invasion was affirmed after the court found 
that the defendant had breached his ‘general duty of care’. Von Caemmerer’s 
theory,64 further pursued by Stoll,65 Larenz,66 and Deutsch,67 has found sig­
nificant BGH support in a decision of the Grosser Zivilsenat.68 To the extent, 
however, that the BGH also appeared prepared to accept in that decision that 
‘conduct in conformity with the law’ is generally a valid ground of legal justifi­
cation in connection with a tortious claim, it has encountered due criticism.69
58 See the account given by Eike Schmidt, in Vahlen Zivilrecht I, p. 495 f.
59 In NJW 1957, 1779, NJW 1967, 1989 and Ennecerus­Nipperdey, Allegmeiner Teil des Bürgelichen 
Rechts, 15th ed. I­II,1959–1960, para. 209.
60 In Verh. d. 34 DJT, I,136, 140 f: see Deutsch, Haftungsrecht, I ,1976, p. 193, pointing out that 
 Reichel’s suggestions were advanced de lege ferenda and not, like Nipperdey’s or Wietholter’s 
(and those of several others) de lege lata: p. 193 footnote 20.
61 Der Rechtfertigungsgrund des verhkehrsrichtigen Verhaltens, 1960.
62 See the references in Deutsch, Haftungsrecht, I , 1976, p. 193.
63 BGHZ 41,123.
64 GesSchriften I,1968, p. 484 f.
65 AcP 162, 228.
66 Schuldrecht I, Vol. II, para. 72 I.
67 Haftungsrecht I, 1976, p. 195 f.
68 BGHZ 24, 21 (GZS); see Stoll, in JZ 1958, 137; Deutsch, Haftungsrecht I,1976, p. 198 f.
69 E.g. Stoll, JZ 1958, 140; also Deutsch, Haftungsrecht I,1976, p. 199.
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F. Flexibility and Pragmatism in the Heart 
of the Old Continent: The Modern Swiss Approach 
to Civil Liability
Swiss tort law, in its greater simplicity and flexibility, has been seen as deviat­
ing from the solid Germanic dogmatic structures of tort liability anchored in the 
protection of important legal goods (rights),70 embedded in par. 823 of the Ger­
man Civil Code.71 The principal deviation, which gives Swiss law its greater 
flexibility and progressive outlook, is the disposal of the German system of a 
numerus clausus of interests protected in tort law, in favour of a wider principle 
of liability for illegal and culpable behaviour that causes injury.72 This capacity 
of Swiss law to adapt to changing demands of social and economic policy is 
enhanced by the greater degree of judicial creativity allowed under the Swiss 
system and encouraged by the Swiss Civil Code.73 A recent example of dynamic 
judicial activism taking Swiss civil liability law further forward has been the 
development in the case law of the Federal Tribunal on the principle of liability 
based on reliance (Vertrauenshaftung),74 an idea originally put forward in Ger­
70 See my paper ‘Liability for Incorrect Financial Information: Theory and Practice in a General Clause 
System and in a Protected Interests System’, in 7 European Review of Private Law 261–286, (1999), 
with further references to comparative law literature.
71 See, for what follows, generally, BaslerKomm/Bearbeiter: Heinrich Honsell et al. (Hrsg.), Kom­
mentar zum schweizerischen Privatrecht, Zivilgesetzbuch I, Art. 1–456 ZGB, 2. Aufl., Basel 2002; 
Obligationenrecht I, Art. 1–529 OR, 3. Aufl., Basel 2003; Gauch Peter/Schluep Walter/Schmid 
Jörg/Rey Heinz, Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 2 Bände, 8. Aufl., Zürich 
2003; Honsell Heinrich, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, 4. Aufl., Zürich 2005; Franz Werro, 
La Responsabilite Civile, Bern 2005.
72 Although retaining, at the same time, the clausula doli that is also found in para. 826 of the German 
Civil Code. Article 41 of the Swiss Law of Obligations, a law incorporated into the Swiss Civil Code 
as its Fifth Part but enacted separately earlier, and with its own enumeration of articles, states: 
‘A. Haftung im Allgemeinen I. Voraussetzungen der Haftung 1 Wer einem andern widerrechtlich 
Schaden zufügt, sei es mit Absicht, sei es aus Fahrlässigkeit, wird ihm zum Ersatze verpflichtet. 2 
Ebenso ist zum Ersatze verpflichtet, wer einem andern in einer gegen die guten Sitten verstossenden 
Weise absichtlich Schaden zufügt.’ These two principles of tort liability of article 41 of the Swiss 
Law of Obligations have been adopted almost verbatim by the Greek Civil Code of 1946, in articles 
914 and 919, and also verbatim by the Turkish Civil Code, a direct transplant from Switzerland in 
1926 (a new version was introduced in 2002).
73 Article 1 SchwZGB, states: ‘... Kann dem Gesetz keine Vorschrift entnommen werden, so soll das 
Gericht nach Gewohnheitsrecht und, wo auch ein solches fehlt, nach der Regel entscheiden, die es 
als Gesetzgeber aufstellen würde ... Es folgt dabei bewährter Lehre und Überlieferung.’
74 See the ground­braking cases: BGE 120 II 331 (‘Swissair case’); BGE 121 III 350 (‘Sporting As­
sociation case’); BGE 124 III 363 (‘Lawyers’ Association case’); BGE 124 III 355 (‘Building con­
sortium case’); BGE 130 III 345 (‘Surveyor’s case’), as well as a number of more recent cases, such 
as BGE 9. July 2004 (5C.45/2004, E. 2), 28. February 2005 (4C.256/2004, E. 9.2.1), 1. June 2005 
(5C.267/2004, E. 5.2/5.3), 9. December 2004 (4C.47/2004, E. 3), 4C.134/2004 of 14. October 2004, 
E. 5, 5C.134/2004 of 1. October 2004, E. 5, 4C.182/2004 of 23. August 2004, E. 4 (‘bounced 
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man legal doctrine by Canaris,75 but never fully espoused by the courts in Ger­
many. The Swiss Federal Tribunal was first to venture in this area of a so­called 
‘third source of civil liability’, besides and beyond the two traditional sources, 
contract and tort.76 In my understanding, this third source or kind of liability can 
cheque’); 4C.291/2003 of 4. February 2003, E. 7 (‘Garden wall’); 4P.137/2002 of 4. July 2003, E. , 
74C.225/2002 of 7. February 2003, E. 3, 4C.215/2002 of 11. November 2002, E. 2 (‘Bank responsi­
bility for financial advice’), 4C.12/2002 of 14. May 2002, E. 3.2, 4C.278/2001 of 20. February 2002, 
E. 6 4C.71/2001 of 30. May 2001, E. 6, 4C.107/2000 of 3. April 2001, E. 3 , 4C.100/2000 of 11. Juli 
2000, E. 4, 4C.194/1999 of 18. January 2000, E. 4 (Protective effect in favour of third parties of reli­
ance liability), 25 February 2005, 4C.357/2004.
75 See Claus­Wilhelm Canaris, Die Vertrauenshaftung im deutschen Privatrecht, München 1971.
76 There is a voluminous Swiss, German and Austrian literature on Vertrauenshaftung: See in particu­
lar, Armbruestler, Vertragliche Haftung für Drittschäden – quo vadis Helvetia?, in: Eugen Bucher 
et al. (Hrsg.), Norm und Wirkung, FS Wolfgang Wiegand, Bern 2005, 71 ff.; Belger, Verhaltens­
pflichten und Vertrauenshaftung, Bern 2000; Belger, Zur Unterscheidung zwischen Rechtsschein­
haftung und Vertrauenshaftung, recht 2002, 201 ff.; Bucher, Was man aus einem Fall von «Putativ­
Vertrauenshaftung» lernen kann, recht 2001, 65 ff.; Bucher, Vertrauenshaftung: Was? Woher? 
Wohin?, in: Peter Forstmoser et al. (Hrsg.), Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung in Theorie und Praxis, FS 
Hans Peter Walter, Bern 2005, 231 ff.; Canaris, Schutzgesetze – Verkehrspflichten – Schutzpflich­
ten, in: FS Karl Larenz, München 1983, 27 ff.; Canaris, Die Reichweite der Expertenhaftung gegen­
über Dritten, ZHR 1999, 206 ff.; Canaris, Die Vertrauenshaftung im Lichte der Rechtsprechung des 
Bundesgerichtshofs, in: 50 Jahre Bundesgerichtshof, Festgabe aus der Wissenschaft, Bd. I, München 
2000, 129 ff.; Chappuis/Winniger (Hrsg.), La responsabilité fondée sur la confiance – Vertrauens­
haftung, Zürich 2001; CommRom/Bearbeiter: Luc Thévenoz/Franz Werro (Hrsg.), Commentaire 
Romand, Code des obligations I, Basel 2003; Fehlmann, Vertrauenshaftung – Vertrauen als alleinige 
Haftungsgrundlage, Diss. Universität St. Gallen, 2002; Frotz, Die rechtsdogmatische Einordnung 
der Haftung für culpa in contrahendo, in: Gedenkschrift Franz Gschnitzer, Innsbruck 1969, 163 ff.; 
Gauch, Der Schätzer und die Dritten, in: Eugen Bucher et al. (Hrsg.), Norm und Wirkung, FS Wolf­
gang Wiegand, Bern 2005, 823 ff.; Gauch Peter/Schluep Walter/Schmid Jörg/Rey Heinz, 
Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 2 Bände, 8. Aufl, Zürich 2003; Hausheer 
Heinz/Jaun Manuel, Die Einleitungsartikel des ZGB, Bern 2003; Honsell, Schweizerisches Haft­
pflichtrecht, 4. Aufl., Zürich; Honsell, Die Haftung für Auskunft und Gutachten, insbesondere ge­
genüber Dritten, in: Festschrift Peter Nobel, Bern 2005, S. 939 ff. (zit. FS Nobel 2005); Koller, 
Haftung einer Vertragspartei für den Schaden eines vertragsfremden Dritten, in: Alfred Koller 
(Hrsg.), Neue und alte Fragen zum privaten Baurecht, St. Gallen 2004, 1 ff.; Koller, Ausservertrag­
liche Haftung eines Ingenieurs für mangelhafte Hangsicherung?, in: Peter Forstmoser et al. (Hrsg.), 
Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung in Theorie und Praxis, FS Hans Peter Walter, Bern 2005, 367 ff.; 
Kramer, Juristische Methodenlehre, 2. Aufl., Bern/München/Wien 2005; Klebs, Sonderverbindung 
und ausserdeliktische Schutzpflichten, München 2000; Koziol, Österreichisches Haftpflichtrecht, 
Bd. I, Allgemeiner Teil, 3. Aufl., Wien 1997; Larenz, Culpa in contrahendo, Verkehrssicherungs­
pflicht und «sozialer Kontakt», MDR 1954, 515 ff.; Loser, Kritische Überlegungen zur Reform des 
privaten Haftpflichtrechts – Haftung aus Treu und Glauben, Verursachung und Verjährung, ZSR 
2003 II, 127 ff.; Loser, Schutzwirkungen zugunsten Dritter, in: Privatrecht und Methode, FS Ernst 
A. Kramer, Basel 2004, 579 ff.; Loser, Ausservertragliche Haftung einer Vertragspartei für reine 
Vermögensschäden Dritter, in: Haftung einer Vertragspartei für Schäden vertragsfremder Dritter, 
St. Gallen 2005, 111 ff.; Loser, Die Vertrauenshaftung im schweizerischen Schuldrecht, Bern 2006; 
Luhmann, Vertrauen – Ein Mechanismus der Reduktion sozialer Komplexität, 3. Aufl. der Origina­
lausgabe von 1968, Stuttgart 1989; Morin, La responsabilité fondée sur la confiance – étude critique 
des fondements d’une innovation controversée, Basel 2002; Rey, Ausservertragliches Haftpflich­
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be seen as founded on the reasonable reliance to its detriment, by one of the par­
ties in a non­contractual, or pre­ or post­contractual, relationship on a promise, 
advice or information, given by the other party.77 
This is a development that any forward looking harmonization of tort law in 
Europe should take on board. As I have argued in another paper some years 
ago,78 in which I offered a set of new principles of European tort law, con­
structed on the experience of Europe’s legal systems and the American experi­
ence, and intended to restate in a unitary, functional approach their diverse tool­
boxes of liability devices, assumption of responsibility is already emerging as a 
unifying basis of all civil liability for negligence, especially in Anglo­American, 
and also, at least on a certain theoretical level, in German, French and Italian 
law. Such assumption of responsibility should be perceived as an objective, nor­
mative concept. It could apply generally in all cases where a person unfairly 
creates a risk of loss to another for self­interest or profit. This new concept of 
assumption of responsibility that I propose should be adopted as expressing a 
transactional view of civil liability.79 The substantial experience of Swiss law in 
this area, present in the numerous cases decided by the Federal Tribunal and 
mentioned above, will be invaluable for any future harmonisation of tort law in 
Europe.
trecht, 3. Aufl., Zürich 2003; Vito, Haftung für Dienstleistungen gegenüber vertragsfremden Drit­
ten, in: Christian J. Meier­Schatz/Rainer J. Schweizer (Hrsg.), Recht und Internationalisierung, Fest­
gabe der Juristischen Abteilung der Universität St. Gallen zum Juristentag 2000, Zürich 2000, 
137 ff.; Vito, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, Zürich 2002, Schmid, Vertrauenshaftung bei For­
mungültigkeit, in: Peter Forstmoser et al. (Hrsg.), Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung in Theorie und 
Praxis, FS Hans Peter Walter, Bern 2005, 417 ff.; Schwenzer Ingeborg, Schweizerisches Obliga­
tionenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 3. Aufl., Bern 2003; Stoll, Abschied von der Lehre von der positiven 
Vertragsverletzung, AcP 136 (1932) 257 ff.; Walter, Die Vertrauenshaftung: Unkraut oder Blume 
im Garten des Rechts?, ZSR 2001 I, 79 ff.; Watter, Investorenschaden wegen falscher Rechnungs­
legung, in: Aktuelle Fragen des Bank­ und Finanzmarktrechts, FS Dieter Zobl, Zürich 2004, 429 ff.; 
BernerKomm/Kramer, OR Einleitung, N 150 f.
77 This formulation of Vertrauenshaftung brings this device very close to the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel in American contract law which, unlike the English doctrine of the same name, can be used 
not only as a defence to a contractual action but also as a basis for an action.
78 Stathis Banakas, ‘European Tort Law: Is it Possible?’ 9 European Review of Private Law, 363–375 
(2002).
79 As an example, I offered the German Supreme Court case of BGH JZ 1993, 682, deciding under 
para. 823 Abs. 2 BGB (German Civil Code), that the managing director of a company assumes re­
sponsibility for informing prospective creditors of the imminent winding up of the company. Profes­
sor Canaris sees this as a case of culpa in contrahendo founded on Vertrauenshaftung: See Canaris, 
‘Die Haftung für fahrlässige Verletzungen der Konkursantragspflicht nach para. 64 GmbHG’, Juris­
tenzeitung 1993, 649 f.
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III. nnn
The overview of the three leading European tort traditions shows both the dif­
ficulty and the futility of a harmonisation of existing dogmatic and conceptual 
structures of European tort laws.80 Additionally, a European tort law can, and 
should, serve the European citizen at the beginning of a new millennium. Rather 
than looking back at the historical roots of the jus commune or even further 
back to the brilliant inventions of classical Roman jurists, the new tort law of 
Europe must be designed to build a safer and fairer social and economic envir­
onment for all Europeans. Throughout history we can look to find the ancestors 
of our values, and the beginnings of our craft, and harvest all ideas and devices 
that are clever and good; but we must set ourselves aims and goals that look to 
the future. To this end the contemporary scholarly debate in the United States 
can be helpful.
We can start by reflecting on the (desired) purpose of the law of tort in a 
united Europe in our time.81 Many centuries ago, Grotius and Pufendorf in 
medieval Europe declared the moral foundation of the law of delict to be an 
obligation to make good any damage caused by one’s culpable behaviour, caus­
ing a major break with the approach of Roman law which was to simply provide 
remedies for certain types of harm that had been declared unlawful. It is sur­
prising that very little of any importance has been said since, insofar as the 
discussion of the purposes of tort law is concerned. One must look at the other 
side of the Atlantic for new ideas closer to our time and age. American scholars 
have elaborated theories of corrective justice, as well as theories of deterrence 
and economic efficiency. Even more radical voices have offered critical studies 
of tort theory that question the need for its very existence. The debate has been 
ongoing in America for quite some time now, and it is certainly surprising that 
its only effect in Europe has been academic, and even so, quite limited.
It is my belief that we cannot build the new tort law of Europe without first 
laying down the ideological foundations of its purpose. To this end, American 
scholarship is an indispensable aid. But Europe in the shape of the European 
Union also already has its own very important political, social, and economic 
aims; these will certainly need to be given priority. Unlike some of the existing 
national tort systems in Europe that predate the modern states in which they 
have found themselves, and therefore, have sometimes evolved separately from 
80 As I have pointed out in my paper, European Tort Law: Is it Possible? 9 European Review of Private 
Law, 363–375 (2002); see also Jane Stapleton, Benefits of Comparative Tort Reasoning: Lost in 
Translation, Journal of tort law Volume 1/Issue 3 (October 2007), available online at http://www.
bepress.com/jtl/vol1/iss3/(last visited 19.3.2008).
81 See Stathis Banakas, ‘Trasformazioni della responsabilita extracontrattuale’, (1998) XLIV Rivista 
di Diritto Civile, 69–83.
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national aims, the new tort law of Europe cannot be developed separately from 
the goals of the European political and social union. It follows from the above 
that a major project of harmonisation of European tort law should deal with:
(A) The purpose of tort law in the emerging European community: tort the­
ories in the beginning of the new millennium in a world in which financial and 
social globalisation are now a reality (more on this infra).
(B) The political, social and economic aims of the European Union, as po­
litical underpinnings of the tort law to be developed., and the directional sig­
nificance of previously accomplished tort law harmonisation. This should lead 
on to a third more substantial aim of establishing the ‘common core’, such as it 
might be, of values, methods and techniques shared by national tort systems in 
Europe. 
IV. nnn
American tort law theory has led the way towards new conceptions of delictual 
liability. The various different theories can be grouped under two general cate­
gories, i.e.:
(A) Theories that can be described as ‘instrumental’82 or, more narrowly, 
‘deterrence’ theories, including the contextual study of legal problems on the 
basis of an economic analysis of the effect of legal rules in the market place; 
and
(B) Theories that can be described as ‘relational’ or ‘moral’ or ‘corrective 
justice theories’.83 Recently, scholars like Gary T. Schwartz have come out in 
82 First propagated by Fleming James Jr. in his article ‘Contribution among Joint Tortfeasors: A Prag­
matic Criticism’, 54 Harvard L. Rev. 1156 (1941). See, further, George L. Priest, ‘The Invention of 
Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law’, 14 J. 
Legal Studies 461 (1985). For a critique of ‘instrumentalist’ tort thinking, see Charles O. Gregory, 
‘Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defence’ 54 Harvard L. Rev. 1170 (1941), answered by 
Fleming James Jr. in ‘Replication’, 54 Harvard L. Rev. 1184 (1941). A good summary of the debate 
between relational and instrumentalist tort theories can be found in Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Thinking 
About Tort Law’, 26 Valparaiso Univ. L. Rev. 717 (1992).
83 See Symposium, ‘Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One’s Neighbours, 77 
Iowa L. Rev. 403 (1992); an excellent review of these theories can be found in Gary T. Schwartz, 
‘Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Deterrence and Corrective Justice’, 75 Texas L. Rev. 1801 
(1997). On the often heated., highly politicised debate about United States tort reform, see Jay 
M. Feinman, Unmaking and Remaking Tort Law, 5 J. High tech. L. 61 (2005); Stathis Banakas, 
What Is Tort Law for in Today’s World?, in Essays on tort, insurance law and society 99 (2006). On 
modern American tort theory from a vast literature see, in particular, Tom F. Lambert Jr., The Juris­
prudence of Hope, 31 J. AM. trial law. ass’N 29 (1965); Michael Rustad, The Jurisprudence of 
Hope: Preserving Humanism in Tort Law, 28 Suffolk u. L. Rev. 1099 (1994). Tort law is also ac­
corded ‘therapeutic’ qualities. See Bruce Feldthusen, The Civil Action for Sexual Battery: Thera­
peutic Jurisprudence?, 25 Ottawa L. Rev. 203 (1993). In Understanding Tort Law, 23 Val. u. L. Rev. 
Article
Banakas 314 SZIER/RSDIE 4/2008
favour of ‘mixed’ theories, combining the ostensibly antithetical goals of effi­
ciency and fairness.84
(A) Whereas the original instrumental theories emphasised the compensa­
tory aspects of tort law, as a ‘public law in disguise’,85 having a regulatory and 
distributional character, aiming at spreading the cost of injuries across the 
community,86 the new economic analysis of tort law, as shown in the work of, 
among others, Calabresi and Posner, aims at deterrence, and at reducing inju­
ries by devising rules that produce economic incentives for safer behaviour.87
The instrumental conception of tort law places the social function of tort 
remedies centre­stage, emancipating tort law from its historical connection with 
criminal law and the principle of individual responsibility based on moral 
wrong. The obligation to repair or compensate damage, or exceptionally, to pay 
aggravated damages, is determined by social and economic considerations of 
the allocation of the risk of specific losses. The instrumental theory of tortious 
liability replaces in the common law systems the concept of ‘unlawfulness’ with 
a concept of ‘legal policy’ based on such considerations. It has been made pos­
sible by the historical development of tort law by the judges, as a system of 
case­law largely unregulated by the legislator, and totally independent from 
criminal law. In the common law world the civil action, even if the tort is also a 
crime, will be litigated separately, with a different procedure and in a different 
legal culture, with a very restrained input from any parallel criminal proceed­
ings allowed through into the tort case.
An instrumental view of liability for negligent harm will give priority not to 
the moral wrongdoing of the defendant but to considerations of economic effi­
ciency and social utility determining where the loss should ultimately fall. For 
moral deterrence and retribution, the job is left to criminal law. As far as civil 
485 (1989), Ernest J. Weinrib goes overboard in his enthusiasm. He states that ‘Explaining love in 
terms of ulterior ends is necessarily a mistake, because a loving relationship has no ulterior end. 
Love is its own end. In that respect, tort law is just like love.’ Id. at 526; Allen M. Linden, Viva 
Torts, 5 J. High Tech. L. 139.
84 Ibid.
85 This point is addressed., in the light of the modern experience and the new ‘individualistic’ turn of 
social consciousness, by Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickley, In the Shadow of the Legislature: 
The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 Michigan L. Rev. 875 (1991).
86 See, e.g., Keeton & O’Connel, Basic Protection for Accident Victims, 1965; T. Ison, The Forensic 
Lottery, 1967.
87 See W. M. Landes & R. A. Posner, ‘The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law’ 15 Georgia L. Rev. 
851 (1981); the literature on the economic analysis of tort law is enormous: see, e.g., Posner, Eco­
nomic Analysis of Law, ch. 6. In Germany, the movement attracted a great deal of interest, and 
generated original works such as Schäfer/Ott, Lehrbuch der ökonomischen Analyse des Zivil­
rechts, 1986. The great English monograph has been Atiyah (ed. P. Cane), Accidents, Compensation 
and the Law; see also Burrows & Veljanowski, The Economic Approach to Law.
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liability is concerned., negligent harm ceases to be personal, it becomes social. 
‘Social objectives supersede legitimate accountability or fault.’88
But in a sophisticated free market economy tort can also be misused., i.e. 
used not to restore unfair or socially dysfunctional loss, but simply, to produce 
wealth for certain professions,89 or to increase the assets of a business, part of 
the phenomenon of so­called ‘paper­entrepreneurism’.90 This has seriously ag­
gravated the mounting social cost of tort litigation in America, the most signifi­
cant fact to be taken into account in developing an economically sound Euro­
pean tort theory for the future.91
(D) Corrective justice or relational tort theories have been understood as 
emphasising the moral purpose of tort law. Their principal strength is their fo­
cus on the structure of tort suits: tort law is interested not in every person who 
behaves wrongly, but only those who, by so behaving, cause harm. This shows 
that tort law is not concerned with deterring wrongful activity, but with correct­
ing its harmful consequences, assessing moreover, the defendant’s liability not 
in reference to the magnitude of the risk created by his conduct, but in reference 
to the extent of harm suffered by the plaintiff.92 According to the prevailing 
theory in America, known as ‘conduct theory of negligence’, negligence is 
‘conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of 
others against unreasonable risk of harm’.93
88 Dogherty, Accountability Without Causality, p. 11.
89 Writers in the so­called ‘Critical Legal Studies’ movement have savagely attacked the capitalist ex­
ploitation of tort liability by lawyers, insurers and entrepreneurs: see Richard L. Abel, ‘A Critique 
of Torts’, 37 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 785 (1990). See further, my article The Method of Comparative Law 
and the Question of Legal Culture Today, 3 Tilburg Foreign Law Rev. 113, 134 f. (1994).
90 See R. Reich, The Next American Frontier, 1983, ch. 7.
91 ‘Tort crisis’ and ‘Tort Reform’ have been hotly debated in America in recent years, and figured as 
political issues in the last Presidential election. See Robert L. Rabin, The Politics of Tort Reform, 
26 Valparaiso Univ. L. Rev. 709 (1992).
92 See e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, ‘Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law’, 2 Law & Philosophy 37 
(1983); Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, 1992, pp. 374–82.
93 Restatement (Second) of Torts Para. 282 (1965); see also Harper & James, The Law of Torts, Second 
Edition by Oscar S. Gray, Boston/Toronto 1986, Vol. 3, p. 382 f., with further references.
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V. nnn
The law making activity of the European Union, during the years of its exist­
ence, in the area of private law and the harmonisation of EU national private 
law systems in a number of important areas of injury are realities that cannot be 
ignored in planning a European tort law. There have been a number of Direc­
tives and Draft Directives in diverse areas, such as: Product Liability for Defec­
tive Products,94 Consumer Protection,95 Consumer Credit,96 Package Travel, 
Package Holidays and Package Tours,97 Unfair terms in Contracts,98 Proposal 
for a Directive on the Liability of Suppliers of Services,99 Proposal for a Direct­
ive on Liability for Injury caused by Waste.100 And, most importantly, the re­
cently published first Draft of the Common Frame of Reference, commissioned 
by the EU Commission, with rules intended to:
‘… be used primarily in relation to contractual and non­contractual rights and obliga­
tions and related property matters’.101
Tort law has also been the subject of on­going academic research into the com­
mon core of European legal systems,102 and is of course, an important part of 
the European Civil Code project.103 Professor von Bar first published in Ger­
many his book on the Common European Tort Law,104 in which he reviews the 
94 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985, now fully implemented by all EU member states.
95 Council Directive 85/557/EEC of 20 December 1985 on Consumer Protection in Contracts negoti­
ated away from business premises.
96 Council Directive 87/102/EEC.
97 Council Directive 90/314/EEC.
98 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 1993.
99 91/C12/11 revised in 1992.
100 89/C251/04.
101 Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common Frame of Refer­
ence (DCFR), interim outline edition available online at http://webh01.ua.ac.be/storme/DCFRInter­
im.pdf (last visited 27.2.2008), Article I.­1:101.
102 Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (General Editors). Volumes on European Tort Law include Pure 
Economic Loss in Europe, edited by Mauro Bussani/Vernon Palmer, Cambridge University Press, 
2003; The Boundaries of Strict Liability in European Tort Law, edited by Franz Werro/Vernon 
Palmer, Carolina Academic Press, Durham NC/Stämpfli Publishers Ltd, Bern/Bruylant, Bruxelles, 
2004; Personal Injury Compensation in European Legal Systems, edited by Stathis Banakas/Gio­
vanni Commande/Philippe Brun (forthcoming 2009).
103 See the Resolutions of the European Parliament of 26 May 1989, OJEC 1989 C 158/400 and 6 May 
1994, OJEC 1994 C 205/518; Symposium ‘Towards a European Civil Code’ held in The Hague, 28 
February 1997; A. S. Hartkamp and Others (eds), Towards a European Civil Code, Dordrecht/
Boston/London 1994, reviewed by S. Banakas in 11 Arbitration International 222 (1995).
104 Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht, Erster Band: Die Kernbereiche des Deliktsrechts, seine An­
gleichung in Europa und seine Einbettung in die Gesamtrechtsordnungen, 1996; see also supra, 
note 2, for an English edition.
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present state of European tort systems, following on from his earlier editing of 
a collective work with national reports on European tort systems.105
However, all is not well with the European tort law project. As I will be 
 arguing in a forthcoming paper in more detail, the published first Draft of 
which,106 despite its claims of modernising European private law, including tort 
law, and making it fit for the 21st century and beyond, is backwards looking to 
the, admittedly impressive for its time and socio­economic conditions, Pandek­
tenwissenschaft of the 19th century.107 With its emphasis on systematic dogmatic 
constructions, abstract definitions and dry logical deductive thinking, not to 
mention the uninspiring language, the Draft misses the point and seems to be 
blissfully unaware of the reality of the law, especially private law at the point of 
delivery in a globalised world. It also completely ignores the increasing impor­
tance of regulation, self­regulation and soft law108 that seriously undermine the 
dogmatic aspirations of traditional private law theory. Additionally, it fails to 
connect with major regimes and instruments of transnational trade law that of 
course also apply in EU territory.
Methodologically, as I have argued in one of my more recent articles,109 a 
critical assessment of the EU’s harmonisation projects needs to be made with a 
pragmatic approach to global justice, involving, to a certain extent, questions of 
universal standards of legal protection, and universal enforcement of legal 
norms. The argument that needs to be put forward is the need for a global, and 
not merely a regional­insular ‘European’, private law perspective, including 
more specifically a view of tort law remedies, as an effective global mechanism 
105 Christian von Bar (ed.), Deliktsrecht in Europa, Köln/Berlin/Bonn 1994; see also supra, note 3, 
for the final version of the text on Principles of Civil Liability for Damages produced by the The 
study group on a european civil code, led by Professor von Bar, available online at http://www.sgecc.
net/media/downloads/updatetortlawarticles_copy.doc (last visited 4.3.2008).
106 Von Bar, Clive, Schulte­Nölke et al. (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European 
Private Law – Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), 2008.
107 The DCFR is currently undergoing a process of evaluation by a network of several academic groups, 
including the ‘Association Henri Capitant des amis de la culture juridique française’ and the ‘Socié­
té de législation comparée’, which have already published ‘Principes contractuels communs’ and 
‘Terminologie contractuelle commune’, B. Fauvarque­Cosson, D. Mazeaud (dir.), collection ‘Droit 
privé comparé et européen’, Volumes 6 and 7, 2008.
108 See forthcoming EUI Workshop on ‘Private Law Remedies, Soft Law and Global Wrongs’, 15th 
December 2008, 3–7pm; also Stathis Banakas, ‘A Global Concept of Justice­Dream or Night­
mare? Looking at Different Concepts of Justice or Righteousness Competing in Today’s World’, 67 
Louisiana Law Review 1021–1041 (2007).
109 ‘A Global Concept of Justice – Dream or Nightmare? Looking at Different Concepts of Justice or 
Righteousness Competing in Today’s World’, 67 Louisiana Law Review 1021 (2007). See also Gun­
ther Teubner & Andreas Fischer­Lescano, ‘Wandel der Rolle des Rechts in Zeiten der Globali­
sierung: Fragmentierung, Konstitutionalisierung und Vernetzung globaler Rechtsregimes’ in Globa­
lisierung und Recht 3, 53 (Junichi Murakami/Hans­Peter Marutschke/Karl Riesenhuber editors, 
2007).
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of restorative, as well as social110 justice. An eminent Canadian judge and 
scholar hailing the global quest for ‘juster justice and a more lawful law,’111 has 
described tort law, as public (and one might add, lately, international public) law 
in disguise, as ‘a compensator, a deterrer, an educator, a psychological ther­
apist, an economic regulator, an ombudsperson, and an instrument for empow­
ering the injured to help themselves and other potential victims of all sorts of 
wrongdoing in our society.’112 Such enthusiasm need not be, of course, the main 
force in harmonising tort law in Europe, but it should at least not be completely 
ignored. To put it more bluntly, the European debate on harmonisation of tort 
law needst o be enriched by questions of how tort law can serve global restora­
tive and social justice, and take on board the possibility of global tort law rem­
edies that may include transnational procedures of collective and class ac­
tions.113 Such global jurisdiction for civil liability suits is currently being tested 
not only in the US, under the old Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789,114 but also in 
Europe.115 Finally, the function of tort law as an alternative source of social wel­
fare, must also inform the debate in Europe. Social welfare, controversial as it 
is on a national level, becomes a moral conundrum if transposed on the global 
level.116 As the United States experience has shown, tort law sometimes offers a 
safety net when social welfare is inadequate, and social justice in the form of 
wealth distribution is pursued through class actions and punitive damages for 
negligence. It is arguable that tort law should not from the point of view of eco­
110 These two different objectives need not be always in conflict, in fact, restorative justice can contrib­
ute to social justice through mechanisms of collective enforcement that spread the wealth of dam­
ages to many, such as class actions.
111 Allen M. Linden, Viva Torts, 5 J. High tech. L. 139, 142 (2005) (quoting Tom Lambert).
112 Allen M. Linden, Viva Torts, 5 J. High tech. L. 139, 143 (2005).
113 Thus, in countries in the French/Spanish legal tradition with highly developed systems of adminis­
trative (public) tort liability, administrative courts enforce tort claims for violations of collective 
rights: see Juan Carlos Henao, Collective Rights and Collective Actions: Samples of European and 
Latin American Contributions, in Exploring tort law 426 (M. Stuart Madden, ed.) (2005), on the 
‘acciones populares’, an administrative law remedy that serves functions similar to class actions. For 
another view of the public function of Tort law in the US, see Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of 
Torts – The case of Punitive Damages, in Exploring tort law 333 (ibid), arguing at p. 337 that the first 
function of Tort law is to enforce societal Norms through the use of private Attorney’s General.
114 Recently exhumed from obscurity in headline­grabbing cases such as Filártiga v. Peña-Irala 630 
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See more in my article ‘A Global Concept of Justice – Dream or Nightmare? 
Looking at Different Concepts of Justice or Righteousness Competing in Today’s World’, 67 Louisi­
ana Law Review 1021 (2007), at p. 1038 f.
115 More in my article ‘A Global Concept of Justice – Dream or Nightmare? Looking at Different Con­
cepts of Justice or Righteousness Competing in Today’s World’, 67 Louisiana Law Review 1021 
(2007), at p. 1038 f.
116 See Hirohide Takikawa, Can We Justify the Welfare State in an Age of Globalization? Toward Com-
plex Borders, in Derecho y Justicia en una Sociedad Global, (Manual Escamilla & Modesto Saave-
dra eds, 2005), at 723.
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nomic efficiency be used as a mechanism of wealth distribution for social jus­
tice as taxation might do the job better and in any event is better suited to ac­
commodate public choice.117 But given the fact that taxation is largely a ‘no­go 
area’ for European harmonisation, this is not an argument that applies to the 
harmonisation of tort law in Europe that could, and arguably should, serve spe­
cific goals of social justice through wealth distribution. The weakening of Eu­
rope’s welfare state has indeed caused an increase in tort litigation in the old 
continent, and it is time, in the process of thinking about a new tort law for Eu­
rope, to reconsider the objections raised against an expansion of the availability 
of punitive damages in European tort law.
VI. nnn
To return to a narrower European perspective, the present trend of European 
tort law harmonisation needs finally, to reflect the general constitutional policy 
of the European Union to give consumer protection a priority. This policy was 
formally adopted by the 1992 European Union Treaty, the Maastricht Treaty, 
which has been aggressively pursued through the EU Commission’s initiatives 
in European contract law118 and the recently announced Green Paper on Con­
sumer Law.119 It is a policy that will have to be taken into account in any attempt 
to create a European system of tortious liability. This will significantly affect 
the perception to be formed as to the different aims of a new European tort 
law.
There is, indeed, no reason for tort law not to combine different aims, such 
as that of corrective justice, economic efficiency and deterrence, and social jus­
tice through wealth distribution, or alternate them in different areas. Consumer 
protection certainly calls for deterrence; product liability is a liability arising 
from wrongs that are of a character deprived of the personal element, something 
that makes corrective justice, in this case, rather unsuitable as the basis of the 
design of liability. On the contrary, the market operations and the masses of 
consumers stand to benefit from tort rules designed to promote economic effi­
ciency and deterrence, and, in very deserving cases social justice through wealth 
117 See David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
439 (2003). It must be added that public choice is, to a certain extent, served by the jury system 
widely used in tort trials in the US, which, like punitive damages, is an anathema for most European 
legal systems.
118 See, e.g., A more coherent european contract law an action plan, com(2003) 68 final, also available 
online at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/com_2003_68_
en.pdf (last visited 27.2.2008).
119 Published in February 2007. Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/
acquis/green­paper_cons_acquis_en.pdf (last visited 4.3.2008).
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distribution.120 Tort rules can work together with administrative or other regula­
tory measures, such as health and safety regulations or regulation of trading 
standards, coupled with criminal or administrative sanctions and rights of auto­
matic compensation. Environmental harm is also better dealt with on the basis 
of a tort philosophy directed towards economic efficiency and deterrence.
Other areas of harmful activity could be better dealt with through tort rules 
designed on the basis of corrective justice principles. Certainly, all cases of in­
tentional or grossly immoral harmful conduct. Moreover, so too could cases of 
non­material harm, such as psychological, psychiatric or other non­material 
harm of similar nature. Finally, some areas such as traffic accident injuries, 
medical malpractice injuries or harm caused by persons, animals or things un­
der the control of another person, are difficult to deal with in exclusively using 
either a corrective justice approach, an economic efficiency and deterrence ap­
proach, or an approach aiming at social justice. These areas call for a ‘mixed’ 
tort philosophy, which takes into account both the personal character of the 
harm and the need to channel and spread the loss efficiently across the commu­
nity or certain sections of it.
120 In the U.S. juries often award punitive damages against manufacturers for harm caused by defective 
products, designed or manufactured defectively; but such awards can be seen as serving deterrence 
as well as social justice, rather than corrective justice, as they typically far exceed the amount of 
actual harm caused. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability.
